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Abstract
This is a discussion of Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy and the Laws of
Credence. I target Pettigrew’s application of the accuracy framework
to derive chance-credence principles. My principal contention is that
Pettigrew’s preferred version of the argument might, in one sense, be
circular. To support this (but also as an objection in its own right), I
argue that Pettigrew’s premises have content that goes beyond that of
standard chance-credence principles in the literature.
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (henceforth alc) is a special achievement.
It is, at once, a manifesto for the epistemic utility research program, a com-
prehensive introduction to the subject, and a trail-blazing investigation of
its frontier. In this note, I investigate one segment of that frontier: Petti-
grew’s attempt to justify a family of principles related to Lewis’s Principal
Principle (Lewis 1980).1 These principles constrain the relationship be-
tween an agent’s credences about chancy events and her credences in propo-
sitions about objective chances. Following custom, and despite some wor-
ries about the accuracy of the label, I refer to the family as chance–credence
principles.
The book’s central goal is to identify and evaluate accuracy arguments
in support of several epistemic norms on rational credences. Part I offers
Pettigrew’s rendition of the accuracy argument for probabilism (originally
from Joyce 1998, 2009). Then, part II presents two broad strategies for
extending this argument to chance–credence principles. These strategies
involve different interventions on the original.
*Thanks to Mike Caie, Kenny Easwaran, and Richard Pettigrew .
1This thread of alc extends Pettigrew’s previous work in (2012, 2013)
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To appreciate the difference between the strategies, it helps to recall
the main ingredients of that argument. Start with the idea that, to assess
the rationality of credal states, we must deploy decision theoretic tech-
niques. What puts the ‘epistemic’ in ‘epistemic rationality’ is not a special
notion of rationality, but a distinctive kind of utility—epistemic utility—to
be plugged into general-purpose decision-theoretic constraints. The epis-
temic utility of having credence c in world w is the inverse of the inaccu-
racy of c in w. The inaccuracy of c in w is the sum of the ‘local’ inaccuracies
of c(p) in w for each proposition p that c is defined on; in turn, these are
measured by the squared Euclidean distance of c(p) from the truth-value
of p in w. That this is the correct notion of epistemic utility stems from a
commitment to veritism, the thesis that the sole source of epistemic value is
accuracy (see Goldman 2002, and alc, pp. 6-9).
Arguments for probabilism typically invoke the rationality constraint
that dominated credences are irrational. Pettigrew’s version appeals to an
even weaker constraint: credence c is irrational if it is strongly dominated
by a credence that is not even weakly dominated and that expects itself, and
only itself, to be maximally accurate (see alc, ch. 2 for discussion).2 The
last component of the argument is a theorem showing that for every non-
probabilistic credence c there is a probabilistic credence c∗ that dominates
c in the above sense. Putting these together, we get that non-probabilistic
credences are irrational.
The first strategy for extending this argument to chance-credence prin-
ciples, inspired by Hájek (ms.), renounces the letter of veritism in favor of
the thesis that credences are vindicated by chances. Accordingly, we ought
to measure the accuracy of a credence held at t in w not against the dis-
tribution of truth-values (at t in w), but against the objective chances (as
they are at t in w). This strategy does not require any amendments to the
decision rule, as it relies on standard dominance constraints. The second
strategy holds on to veritism but appeals to a stronger constraint than dom-
inance (see below). Pettigrew ultimately endorses this second strategy as
2It is very easy to get confused when using the language of ‘weakness’ and ‘strength’ in
relation to norms, especially ones that have a conditional form. So let’s be totally explicit:
say that rationality constraint N1 entails constraint N2 just in case every act (or state) that
is classified as irrational by N2 is also classified as irrational by N1. Furthermore, say that
N1 is stronger than N2 iff N1 asymmetrically entails N2 (in which case N2 is weaker). This
means that the principle that says that being strongly dominated is irrational is weaker
than the principle that says that being weakly dominated is irrational. This might be con-
fusing, but it is as it is supposed to be. So to say that Pettigrew bases his argument on a
weakening of dominance is to say that he uses a principle that classifies strictly fewer acts
as irrational.
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his official justification of chance-credence principles, because of the first
strategy’s deviation from veritism.
After presenting some background (§1) and providing details on the
second strategy (§2), I will challenge two aspects of this strategy. §§3-4
question whether Pettigrew has successfully dealt with concerns about the
circularity of the argument (these concerns arise because of the strength of
the decision-theoretic rule). In §5, I argue that the second strategy proves
more than we should expect to fall out of chance-credence principles. In
particular, while chance-credence principles are most naturally interpreted
as coherence constraints (regulating the coherence between beliefs of one
sort and beliefs of another sort), the new decision-theoretic principle entails
narrow-scope verdicts that go well beyond requirements of coherence.
One last note before diving in: in part IV of the book (§14.2), Pettigrew
also runs an accuracy argument for the reflection principle (van Fraassen
1984). This argument closely mirrors the structure of the arguments for
chance-credence principles. Many of the comments I will make about the
justification of chance-credence principles have close correlates within that
particular argument for reflection. Since these correlates can nonetheless be
evaluated differently, I will occasionally remind the reader of this parallel
(though I will also lack the space to provide much additional detail).
1 The variety of chance-credence principles
Stating chance-credence principles requires modeling languages with un-
usual expressive capacities. It is not enough for the language L to talk about
chancy events. That is, it is not enough if L features sentences like “the coin
will land heads”, or “most of the polonium on the victim’s body will decay
within a year”. In addition, L must express what I will call chance hypothe-
ses: these are propositions that characterize the state of objective chances in
a world (or perhaps, in a world at a time). Chance hypotheses come in two
varieties:
Ur-chance hypotheses are propositions, here denoted by ‘Cch’, that are
true in world w just in case w’s ur-chance function is ch (the ur-chance
of w is the chance function at the beginning of w’s history, assuming
that w’s history has a beginning)
Temporal chance hypotheses are propositions, here denoted by ‘Tch’, that
are true in w at t just in case the chances in w at t are provided by ch.
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The key difference is that the former are time-invariant, while the latter
may have truth-values that vary across times (Caie 2015, alc, 9.2).
Among the many side contributions of alc is a useful taxonomy of
chance-credence principles. These are classified along three main dimen-
sions. Given principle P and agent α, consider these questions:
Q1 what kind of chance hypothesis does P appeal to? (ur-chance hy-
potheses vs. temporal chance hypotheses)
Q2 is P formulated as constraint on α’s initial credence function or as a
constraint on α’s current credence function?
Q3 does P include a restriction to admissible evidence?
Lewis’s Principal Principle constrains initial credence functions conditional
on ur-chance hypotheses.3 More recently, however, Caie (2015) has de-
fended chance-credence principles that constrain current credences condi-
tional on temporal chance hypotheses. Pettigrew agrees that these are the
crucial principles to justify, and thus focuses on:4
Evidential Temporal Principle (etp) If an agent has credence
function c and total evidence E, then rationality requires that
c(X |Tch) = ch(X |E)
for all propositions X in F and all possible chance functions ch
such that Tch is in F and c(Tch) > 0.5
The two main accuracy arguments in part II of alc seek to establish etp.6
2 Two arguments for chance-credence principles
I sketched two routes to the conclusion that an agent who violates etp must
be irrational. An example will help flesh them out:
3Notoriously, Lewis gave two formulations of the Principal Principle, only one of which
made reference to admissible information (Meacham 2010). The principles I discuss here
do not appeal to admissible evidence.
4If one prefers something closer to the original version of the Principal Principle, Pet-
tigrew (2013) offers a very similar accuracy argument, as does the introduction to chapter
10 of alc. While in footnote-land, I might add that Pettigrew’s reasons for focusing on etp
are different from Caie’s.
5‘F ’ is Pettigrew’s label for the algebra over which the agent’s credences are defined.
6I will operate under the simplifying assumption that there are no self-undermining
chances. That is, there is no chance ch such that ch(Tch) < 1. Most of alc (with the exception
of chapter eleven, the last of part II) operates under this assumption as well.
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Suppose that Diana is about to take a three point shot, and as-
sume for the sake of argument that three point shots are chancy
events. Steph has credences over the outcome of Diana’s shot
and over the relevant temporal chance hypotheses. Steph’s total
evidence is E. Steph is certain that a particular temporal chance
hypothesis Tch is true (i.e. c(Tch) = 1). That is, he is certain that
the current chance function is given by ch. According to ch, the
chance of Diana’s making the shot (conditional on E) is .4. Steph,
however, is very confident that Diana will make the shot: he as-
signs credence .9 to that proposition.
Plausibly, something is defective in Steph’s credal state, and etp tells us
what it is: Steph is much more confident in X than is warranted by a chance
hypothesis he is certain of. If etp admits of a deeper justification, we should
be able to characterize the defectiveness of Steph’s credal state directly in
terms of more fundamental principles.
According to the first strategy, Steph is irrational because his credence
is dominated. But, in the context of this strategy, the appropriate epistemic
utility function at t in w tracks the squared Euclidean distance from the
chance function at t in w—not the squared Euclidean distance from the
truths at t in w. Equipped with this alternate notion of epistemic utility,
Pettigrew proves that there is a credence c∗ that strongly dominates Steph’s
c, and that c∗ is itself not weakly dominated. Steph’s credence is irrational
after all.
Pettigrew finds this strategy objectionable because he thinks that the
idea that chances vindicate credences is not truly veritistic. This is because
he maintains that, on virtually every theory of objective chance, the chances
in a world are "information-losing summaries of the truths" at that world.
From a veritistic standpoint, the claim that our credences ought to match
those information-losing summaries seems unmotivated (alc, §9.4).
The second strategy—alc’s official strategy—reverts back to the idea
of alethic vindication: local inaccuracy is to be measured as distance from
truth-value. Because vindication is purely alethic, Steph’s probabilistically
coherent credence is not dominated in the standard sense. Hence, any argu-
ment for etp must go by way of some stronger decision-theoretic constraint.
Pettigrew proposes a different rationality constraint. Momentarily ig-
noring some nuances, this constraint states that option o is irrational if there
is an option o∗ such that all the possible current chance functions expect o
to be less accurate than o∗. As far as I can tell, the notion of ‘possible current
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chance function’ C is not explicitly defined in alc. Pettigrew (p.c.) suggests
interpreting this as the set of functions ch such that Tch is consistent with
the agent’s total evidence. For later discussion, I want to offer another, more
subjective interpretation: C consists of the set of functions ch such that the
agent assigns non-zero credence to Tch.
Working towards a more precise statement of the rationality constraint,
let ‘Expu(o |pr)’ denote the expected utility of o calculated relative to utility
function u and probability function pr; let ‘chE’ denote the function that
inputs a proposition p and outputs ch(p|E). Next, define some auxiliary
concepts:
o∗ bests o relative to ch and E iff
Expu(o | chE) < Expu(o∗ | chE)
(when the sign is ‘=’ we say that o∗ equals o)
Letting C be the set of possible current chance functions, define:
i) o∗ strongly chance dominates o relative to C and E iff for all
ch ∈ C, o∗ bests o relative to ch and E.
ii) o∗ weakly chance dominates o relative to C and E iff
(a) for all ch ∈ C, o∗ bests or equals o relative to ch and E and
(b) for some ch ∈ C, o∗ bests o relative to ch and E.
In terms of these concepts we can state Pettigrew’s principle, a new suffi-
cient condition for irrationality:
Current Chance Dominance (ccd) Credence c is irrational for
an agent with total evidence E if
(a) c is strongly chance dominated by a probabilistic c∗ condi-
tional on E
(b) c∗ is not weakly chance dominated conditional on E and
(c) c∗ is not extremely modest.
Pettigrew proves that an agent who violates probabilism or ETP must meet
that sufficient condition, and hence is irrational. As anticipated in the in-
troduction, a parallel principle of ‘future credence dominance’ is involved
in the justification of the reflection principle (alc, p. 194).
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Before assessing this second version of the argument, pause to note that
there is a level of ambition that is only available to proponents of the first
strategy. A proponent of the first strategy might hope to obtain a simultane-
ous justification of probabilism and etp. The second strategy cannot share
this ambition. This is because it is plausible that a justification of proba-
bilism should not presuppose overtly probabilistic constraints (Easwaran
2014). Arguably, ccd’s use of expectations is one such problematic presup-
position.7
This does not damage alc’s overall argument. Instead of seeking to jus-
tify both requirements by a single argument, we might think of the justifi-
cation as coming in two separate steps (appropriately corresponding to the
first two parts of the book). Step one is the dominance-based justification
of probabilism. Step two is the ccd-based justification of chance-credence
principles. As long as the rationality constraints do not conflict and the
utility function remains veritistic, the epistemic value monism at the center
of Pettigrew’s program remains unassailed.
3 The two circularity objections
However, there are other important questions concerning the viability of
the second strategy. Pettigrew identifies and discusses the worry that ccd
might pack too much to serve as a justification of etp.
Pettigrew calls this the Circularity Objection. I think, however, that it is
useful to distinguish at the outset between two different kinds of circularity
worries—corresponding to two ways in which arguments might be circular
(Sinnott-Armstrong 1999, Rips 2002). Very roughly, we can say that argu-
ments are structurally circular when their conclusion is one of the premises
or must figure in any reasonable justification of the premises. By contrast,
they are dialectically circular when they rely on premises that would not (or
should not) be accepted by the opponent, because they are too close to the
conclusions that they are to support.8 An important difference is that di-
alectical circularity does not require that the conclusion itself appear in the
justification chain. For an extreme example of dialectical circularity, imag-
ine trying to justify probabilism by assuming, among other things, that cre-
dences are additive. This attempt would fail not because any justification of
7Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010) might have taken exception to this claim, but it is no-
table that alc relies on weakenings of dominance for all its main arguments.
8Sinnott-Armstrong (1999) reserves the word ‘circular’ for the first type of argument.
Instead, he labels the second type of argument as ‘question-begging’.
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the additivity constraint must appeal to probabilism, but because additivity
packs too much of what needs to be justified.
Dialectical circularity shows up in alc as the worry that ccd might be
“no more plausible than etp itself” (p. 129). Structural circularity as the
worry that etpmight itself be necessary to justify ccd. Though both versions
of the objection are voiced, Pettigrew’s discussion is heavily focused on the
structural variant of the objection. After sketching an argument purporting
to justify ccd on the basis of a strengthening of etp, he gives two reasons to
reject it: first, the premises in this argument seem to be less general in their
application than ccd; second, they seem more substantive in content. This
suggests that the argument is not structurally circular, after all.
Even granting all that, this line of reasoning only deals with structural
circularity. This means that, as far as the discussion of alc goes, the threat
of dialectical circularity is still looming, since dialectical circularity is per-
fectly compatible with the claim that ccd is more general and less substan-
tive in content than etp.
To investigate the dialectical circularity objection, we need to get trac-
tion on the vague-sounding question whether ccd is too close to etp to jus-
tify it. The first thought might be to ask: what do we need, in addition to
ccd, to obtain the basic verdicts that chance-credence principle are meant
to systematize? If we need to add relatively little, that will count as defea-
sible pressure to accept the claim that ccd is ‘too close’ to etp to justify it.
If we need extremely substantive assumptions, then the charge of dialecti-
cal circularity seems misplaced. The problem is that this approach does not
seem very conclusive in this case: although ccd does do much of the work in
deriving etp, it does not do all of it.9 And it is hard to have an independent
assessment of whether the required auxiliary assumptions are substantive
enough.
4 Choosing Decision Rules
There is another, and I think more productive, way of advancing the worry
that ccd is dialectically circular. This focuses not on what we must add to
it to derive etp, but on what we must sacrifice to take it on board.
Start by asking: why should the rationality of an agent’s preferences be
constrained by ccd? Suppose that, as most Bayesians do, we accept
9In fact, a first step in this direction is already in Pettigrew (2013), who proves that the
general theorem goes through for any strictly proper scoring rule.
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eu. Rationality requires that an agent with credence c, total evi-
dence E and utility u prefer o to o∗ iff Expu(o∗|cE) < Expu(o|cE)
If anything deserves to be called a standard constraint on preference, it is
eu.10 Now, we might ask a broad methodological question: when are we
justified in deviating from eu in setting up an accuracy argument for some
rational constraint?
One reason for deviating is concern that the full strength of eu would
make our decision-theoretic justifications circular. In such cases, we might
need a weaker rule that is nonetheless compatible with eu. This is why, as
noted, standard accuracy arguments for probabilism do not deploy expec-
tation – based rules, and instead use dominance requirements.
The other possible reason not to use eu is if it is not applicable in the
circumstances our agents find themselves in. Pettigrew resorts to this kind
of consideration in part III of alc. Part III lays out accuracy arguments for
the principle of indifference. These arguments appeal to generalizations
and strengthenings of maximin—the rule according to which it is rational
to prefer o∗ to o just in case the minimum outcome guaranteed by o∗ ex-
ceeds the minimum outcome guaranteed by o. But Pettigrew is careful to
formulate maximin and its variants as principles that apply only when the
agent has no evidence whatsoever. It is plausible to rule such circumstances
out of the domain of applicability of eu. If we do that, there is no tension
between maximin-like principles and eu. However, neither of these reasons
for deviating from eu applies to ccd. The only requirement for applying
ccd is that the agent assign credences to chance hypotheses.
I think, then, that a more convincing way of advancing the dialectical
circularity worry is based on this line of thought.
Once we are done justifying probabilism, we ought to default
back to eu, unless we have a reason to think that eu does not
apply. But in the vast majority of cases, we have no such reason.
So, in the vast majority of cases, we ought to default to eu. Now,
in some of these cases eu and ccd make incompatible require-
ments. This can happen because eu constrains rational prefer-
ences on the basis of the agent’s credences while ccd constrains
them on the basis of the unanimous agreement of the possible
current chance functions.
10I recognize of course that someone like Buchak (2014) would resist eu. But the points
made in this section survive even if we prefer a different account of rational preference,
such as Buchak’s.
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The threat of dialectical circularity arises here because, to uphold ccd, we
need a reason to think that it ought to take priority over eu when they con-
flict. It is hard to see what would push us to sacrifice such a central part
of the Bayesian picture, other than a desire to vindicate chance-credence
principles.
5 Narrow scope entailments of ccd
There is a passage in alc that speaks to a worry in this general ballpark.
Pettigrew notes that the second strategy “will not satisfy someone who is
not already convinced that we should defer to chances in some way. Doing
more is beyond the scope of this project.” (p.131) In other words: if we start
with some mild attitude of deference to chance, accuracy arguments will
help us squeeze out more robust chance-credence principles. Perhaps (here
comes an additional step that is not explicitly taken by Pettigrew), that mild
attitude involves prioritizing ccd over eu when they conflict.
I think we should resist this line of thought. To motivate my resistance,
I want to offer a more direct criticism of ccd and of the second strategy as
a whole. The second strategy delivers verdicts that go well beyond the con-
tent of chance-credence principles—and, what is more, verdicts that do not
strike me as mild ways of deferring to chance. Which verdicts these are de-
pends on how we characterize the set of possible current chance functions.
As I noted earlier, there are a couple of possible ways of characterizing this
set. Consequently, there are a couple of ways of running this argument. I
consider each in turn.
Start with the evidential construal suggested to me by Pettigrew (p.c.):
the possible current chance functions are those ch such that Tch is consistent
with one’s total evidence. Suppose that Margot’s total evidence E is only
compatible with chance function ch1 (i.e., E entails Tch1). Suppose that, de-
spite this, Margot is certain that the current chances are given by ch2 (i.e.,
cMargot(Tch2) = 1). Given that E entails Tch1 , she is either not probabilisti-
cally coherent or not logically omniscient. Importantly, she might be non-
omniscient without being incoherent, provided we treat logical omniscience
with techniques such as those advocated in Garber’s (1983).11 Finally (and
crucially), suppose that all of Margot’s other credences harmonize with ch2,
so when X is a chancy event, cMargot(X) = ch2(X |E).
11Since the issue of logical omniscience does not arise at all in alc, I assume that Petti-
grew intends to stay consistent with the main Bayesian treatments of logical omniscience.
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My judgment here is that, although Margot is in one sense irrational,
she is not violating a chance-credence principle. Chance-credence prin-
ciples regulate the coherence of Margot’s credences about chancy events
and her credences about chancy hypotheses. Margot’s irrationality does not
stem from this kind of conflict: her attitudes concerning these propositions
are coherent even though she is failing to recognize what her evidence sup-
ports.
This is not the verdict we get if we follow the second strategy. The for-
mal reason behind this is proven (you guessed it!) by Pettigrew, who notes
that the second strategy actually entails a strengthening of etp:
etp+ If an agent has credence c and total evidence E then ratio-
nality requires that c be in the closure of the convex hull of the
set C (where C is the set of possible current chance functions).
If C is a singleton then the closure of the convex hull is that same singleton.
When, as in Margot’s case, C = {ch1}, rationality requires Margot to prefer
ch1 to her own credence. My reason for concern, to repeat, is that this goes
beyond the content of etp. Because etp is a coherence requirement, it is
silent on how the agent ought to resolve the incoherence in her state. It
is also silent on whether the agent should prefer a credence that alters her
belief in chance hypotheses as opposed to a credence that alters her beliefs
in propositions describing chancy events. If that is right, ccd would appear
to embody more than a mild commitment to defer to chances.
The other construal involves a subjective interpretation of possible cur-
rent chance functions as those functions ch such that c(Tch) > 0. This avoids
the problem of the previous construal: when C = {ch2}, etp+ requires Mar-
got to have ch2 as her credence, which she does. If she is irrational, it is
because of a principle other than etp.
However, on this construal, the problematic narrow scope verdicts arise
for agents who violate etp. Consider an agent who, like Steph in my exam-
ple from §2, has c(X) = .9, c(Tch) = 1, with ch(X |E) = .4. Once again we have
that C = {ch}, so, according to etp+, epistemic rationality requires Steph to
prefer ch to his own credence. But that too is too strong: given that chance-
credence principles are coherence constraints, they are silent on whether
the defect in Steph’s state lies with his credence in X or with his certainty in
Tch. He should not be mandated by epistemic rationality to prefer ch to his
own credence.
Taking stock, no matter how we characterize the set of possible current
chance functions, the second strategy yields narrow scope requirements of
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rationality that go beyond the content of chance-credence principles. More-
over, checking-in once again on the parallel argument for the reflection
principle, we can make similar considerations. Pettigrew’s ‘future credence
dominance’ principle yields similar narrow scope verdicts: if one is certain
that one will have a particular credence, then one is presently required to
prefer that credence to one’s current credence if they disagree. But all the
standard formulations of reflection, including the one that Pettigrew uses,
merely require that one’s present credence and one’s credences about one’s
future credences harmonize in a particular way.
Of course, my contention that chance-credence and reflection princi-
ples are just coherence constraints might be controversial. For instance, it
does not sit well with the fact that these principles are often glossed as ‘def-
erence’ principles, or described as having an evidential source. But nothing
corresponds to these glosses in the formal content of the principles them-
selves. Perhaps, the glosses are best understood as concerning what hap-
pens when the principles are applied to model certain types of situations.
If so, they would not be part of what needs to be vindicated by a justification
of those principles.
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